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Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 34, and in accordance with Rules 34.1, 35, and 36, 
Plaintiff/Respondent Caldwell Land & Cattle, LLC (“CLC”) respectfully responds to the 
Appellant’s Brief filed by Defendant/Appellant Johnson Thermal Systems, Inc. (“JTS”). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE (I.A.R. 35(b)(3)) 
Statement of the Case. This appeal is taken from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (“Findings and Conclusions”) [R. 957-67], Order Awarding Costs and Attorney Fees to 
Plaintiff (“Order Awarding Fees”) [R. 974-82], and Amended Judgment (“Am. Judgment”) [R. 
983-84] entered by the District Court against JTS: (1) finding JTS “guilty of unlawful detainer” 
under Idaho Code § 6-303; (2) finding JTS liable for breach of a “Commercial Lease Agreement” 
(the “Lease”) (Trial Ex. 11); (3) awarding CLC damages for unlawful detainer and breach of 
                                               
1 All trial exhibits cited herein are on record with the Court. Certificate of Exhibits [R. 1000-01]. 
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contract according to the Lease; and (4) awarding CLC attorney fees. JTS takes issue with the 
District Court’s legal conclusions regarding JTS’s unlawful detention and breach of contract, and 
with the District Court’s factual findings concerning JTS’s failure to exercise a six-month option 
included in an amendment to the Lease (the “Third Amendment”). Trial Ex. 3. JTS avers that the 
District Court’s award of damages is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. JTS 
also asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. 
As discussed below, the District Court found JTS guilty of unlawfully detaining 
commercial property (the “Property”) that JTS leased from CLC and CLC’s predecessor, the 
Gilbert Family Partnership (“Gilbert”), under the Lease. The District Court correctly awarded CLC 
damages for JTS’s unlawful detainer under Idaho Code § 6-316. Because JTS’s unlawful detainer 
concerned its default of the Lease, the District Court also correctly considered CLC’s related 
claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith, as well as JTS’s 
contract-based counterclaims. The District Court correctly found that JTS did not exercise the six-
month option in the Third Amendment. Because JTS did not exercise the six-month option, the 
District Court correctly found that JTS carried over as a month-to-month tenant and, thereafter, 
unlawfully detained the Property and breached the Lease by refusing to vacate after receiving 
notice of termination. The District Court found JTS liable for breach of contract and breach of the 
implied covenant, and correctly awarded damages to CLC according to provisions in the Lease 
that carried over into JTS’s holdover tenancy. According to indemnity provisions contained in the 
Lease, these damages properly included compensating CLC for its resulting liability to Caldwell 
Peterbilt, Inc. (“Peterbilt”), CLC’s new tenant, because of the delay caused by JTS’s unlawful 
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detainer and breach of contract. JTS also breached the Lease by removing an electrical transformer 
(the “Transformer”) without CLC’s permission, which left the Property without 480V power and 
created further substantial delay and caused CLC to incur added liability and damages. The District 
Court’s findings of unlawful detainer and breach of contract were not inconsistent and conformed 
with the Lease, and the District Court did not award duplicate damages for claims. Following entry 
of judgment against JTS, the District Court appropriately awarded attorney fees and costs to CLC, 
the prevailing party, which were increased in significant part by JTS’s aggressive defense before 
and during trial, and its filing several post-judgment motions denied by the District Court.  
CLC respectfully requests the Court affirm the District Court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and final judgment. CLC further requests the Court award it attorney fees and 
costs for this appeal and issue the appropriate remittitur to the District Court. 
Course of the Proceedings Below. CLC initiated this action when JTS still occupied the 
Property and refused to vacate despite receiving notice of termination. Complaint for Eviction at 
7, ¶¶ 29-31 [R. 29]. CLC prayed for restitution and damages caused by JTS’s unlawful detainer. 
Id. at 9, ¶ 38 [R. 31]. After JTS abruptly abandoned possession (despite repeated representations 
that it would not vacate), CLC filed an amended complaint that reasserted a first claim for unlawful 
detainer damages and separately alleged a second claim for breach of the Lease and third claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Am. Complaint at 13-17, ¶¶ 57-77 [R. 62-66].2 JTS 
answered and asserted counterclaims that were also premised on the Lease. Answer to Am. 
                                               
2 JTS asserted a fourth claim for intentional injury to the Property, which was dismissed by the 
District Court and is not the subject of appeal. Findings and Conclusions at 8 n. 1 [R. 964].  
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Complaint and Counterclaim (“Answer and Counterclaim”) at 10-13, ¶¶ 24-48 [R. 102-05]. 
A three-day bench trial was held on all claims. [Tr. Vol. I, 1-187]. (Before trial, the District 
Court denied motions for summary judgment filed by both parties. [R. 196-202, 337-38].) After 
trial, the parties submitted closing arguments by brief, which cited to transcripts of trial testimony 
and admitted exhibits. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief [R. 593-615]; Defendant’s [Proposed—and 
Denied—] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 573-92]. As introduced above, the District 
Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of CLC and, later, entered judgment 
against JTS. Findings and Conclusions [R. 957-67]; Judgment [R. 955-56]. Following entry of 
judgment, the District Court granted CLC’s request for attorney fees and costs. Order Awarding 
Fees [R. 974-82]. The District Court also denied JTS’s motion to reconsider and to alter, 
amend, or vacate the judgment. Decision Denying Combined Motions [R. 968-71]. The District 
Court then entered an amended judgment, from which JTS appealed. Am. Judgment [R. 983-
84]; Notice of Appeal [R. 946-54]; Am. Notice of Appeal [R. 985-95]. JTS posted a supersedeas 
bond and execution of the judgment was stayed. Am. Order Staying Execution [] [R. 996-98]. 
Statement of Facts. JTS initially leased the Property from CLC’s predecessor, Gilbert, 
from March 2012 to April 2013. Trial Ex. 1. JTS and Gilbert twice extended the Lease in writing; 
the first extension was through April 2014; and the second extension was through October 2015. 
Trial Exs. 2, 3. The second extension, the Third Amendment, was entered with the understanding 
that JTS was constructing a new building and would vacate the Property as soon as that building 
was completed. Trial Ex. 4 [Tr. Vol I, 8 (17:13-17), 20-21 (68:22-69:1)]. At JTS’s insistence, the 
Third Amendment contained an option to extend for another six months through April 2015 or 
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continue month to month. Trial Ex. 3 at ¶ 3; Trial Ex. 4 [Tr. Vol. I, 10 (25:9-12), 18 (57:25-58:3)]. 
JTS understood that Gilbert planned to find a new tenant or purchaser of the Property as soon as 
JTS vacated. [Tr. Vol. I, 9 (22:8-13), 11 (29:5-16), 65 (229:5-10)]. 
JTS did not exercise the six-month option. In several communications between JTS and 
Gilbert’s agent about the Lease, JTS never expressed any written or oral intent to exercise the six-
month option. [Tr. Vol. I, 13 (39:11-19) (40:7-10), 17 (55:13-56:7), 23-24 (78:21-79:4) (80:13-
81:1) (82:21-83:5), 38 (138:4-13), 40 (147:12-20), 66 (232:16-233:7), 68 (241:9-19)]. Instead, JTS 
only communicated potential exit dates that were less than six months. Trial Exs. 5-7 [Tr. Vol. I, 
67-68 (237:6-16) (239:24-240:4) (242:1-13)]. JTS also did not pay rent through April 2015. [Tr. 
Vol. I, 24 (81:16-82:12)]. Because of JTS’s expressed intent to vacate and stay “for an additional 
3-6 months,” in October 2014, at the end of the extended term, Gilbert listed the Property for sale. 
Trial Ex. 7 [Tr. Vol. I, 22 (75:2-11)]. Gilbert’s agent understood that the six-month option had not 
been exercised. [Tr. Vol. I, 76 (275:16-22), 67-68 (237:17-241:8)]. When the Property was listed 
for sale, JTS continued to occupy and pay monthly rent. Gilbert’s agent specifically asked JTS to 
keep him informed about the date that JTS planned to vacate. Trial Ex. 7. However, JTS never 
informed Gilbert or Gilbert’s agent that it might occupy the Property through April 2015. [Tr. Vol. 
I, 12 (34:20-35:6), 22 (75:21-76:13), 67-68 (237:17-241:8)].  
In November 2014, CLC purchased the Property from Gilbert. Trial Ex. 8 [Tr. Vol. I, 100 
(370:15-21)]. Consistent with JTS’s representations, CLC contemplated that JTS would vacate 
within a month of closing so that CLC’s new tenant, Peterbilt, could move in. [Tr. Vol. I, 103 
(380:7-10)]. Before the Property closed, CLC entered a lease with Peterbilt (the “Peterbilt Lease”), 
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which obligated CLC to make the Property available starting on February 1, 2015. Trial Ex. 21 at 
3, § 2.1(g) [Tr. Vol. I, 100 (371:17-20), (379:11-17)]. 
In early December 2014, Gilbert’s agent notified JTS that the Property would be sold and 
said that the new tenant wanted to move in as soon as possible. Trial Ex. 9. For the first time, JTS 
asserted that it had purportedly exercised the six-month option by continuing to pay rent for the 
months of November and December. Id. [Tr. Vol. I, 36 (131:15-132:7), 66 (233:12-21), 77 
(276:14-24)]. However, these payments were sent to Arlene Gilbert (an elderly widow living in 
St. George, Utah) and not to Gilbert’s agent,3 who had requested notice of JTS’s plans to vacate. 
[Tr. Vol. I, 23-24 (80:13-81:11), 62 (218:5-12)]. The payments were also not accompanied with a 
written exercise of the six-month option. [Tr. Vol. I, 36 (132:3-11)]. While JTS belatedly claimed 
that the six-month option was exercised, internally, its principals stated that this argument was for 
gaining leverage to delay an eviction. Trial Ex. 9. At trial, JTS could not show its purported intent 
to exercise the six-month option before the term of the Lease expired in October 2014. [Tr. Vol. I, 
23 (80:9-12), 37 (133:8-15), 40-41 (146:5-9) (147:21-148:11), 184 (686:7-687:11)]. 
On December 11, 2014, Gilbert sent a “Notice of Termination” of the Lease to JTS and 
requested that it vacate by January 31, 2015. Trial Ex. 13. Gilbert and CLC closed on December 
31, 2014, and CLC assumed the Lease. [Tr. Vol. I, 100 (370:22-23)]. In communications with 
CLC, JTS refused to vacate by the noticed date. [Tr. Vol. I, 104-05 (384:8-389:19)]. On January 
29, 2015, JTS’s attorney informed that JTS would not vacate until April 15, 2015. Trial Ex. 17. 
                                               
3 See also footnote 20, infra. 
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However, sometime on or around February 15, 2015, JTS abruptly abandoned the Property. 
Findings and Conclusions at 3 [R. 959] (resolving the disputed issue when JTS vacated).  
When JTS finally vacated, it did not make certain repairs to the Property. Trial Ex. 18 [Tr. 
Vol. 42-43 (153:5-13) (157:4-6)]. After JTS vacated, but in the immediate days before Peterbilt 
could move in, JTS instructed Idaho Power to remove a Transformer located on the Property. Trial 
Ex. 20 [Tr. Vol. I, 35 (127:20-128:3), 80 (288:2-24)]. Removing the Transformer deprived the 
Property of 480V power, which was necessary for Peterbilt to make use of the premises. [Tr. Vol. 
I, 48-49 (180:8-182:2), 88 (320:19-321:10)]. Although JTS understood that it required permission, 
it did not inform or ask CLC to enter the Property and remove the Transformer. [Tr. Vol. I, 31 
(109:11-17), 35-36 (128:4-130:8), 42 (156:15-21), 107 (396:9-12)]. Had JTS informed CLC, then 
Idaho Power would not have removed the Transformer to deprive the Property of power. [Tr. Vol. 
I, 85 (308:13-24) (309:24-310:2)]. Because of JTS’s actions, first, by refusing to vacate by January 
31, 2015, and later, by removing the Transformer, Peterbilt was unable to occupy the Property 
until after the end of April 2015 when power was restored. [Tr. Vol. I, 87-89 (316:18-317:14) 
(323:8-324:10), 99 (364:7-19), 145-46 (532:16-25) (535:23-536:9)].  
At trial, CLC presented evidence of damages, including liability that it incurred to Peterbilt 
because of the delay caused by JTS’s actions. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 15-17 [R. 608-10] 
(citing exhibits and testimony). Contrary to JTS’s averment, the District Court did not award 
damages simply because JTS overstayed the Lease by two weeks. Appellant’s Brief at 3. Rather, 
the District Court awarded damages because of JTS’s unlawful detention and breach of the Lease, 
including removing the Transformer, which caused damages to CLC. Findings and Conclusions 
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at 8-9 [R. 964-65]. Under the Lease, JTS agreed to indemnify CLC for the liability it incurred to 
Peterbilt. Trial Ex. 1 at 2, 5. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL (I.A.R. 35(b)(4)) 
1. Did the District Court correctly award damages caused by JTS’s unlawful detention? 
2. Did the District Court correctly consider the parties’ related claims under the Lease? 
3. Did the District Court correctly find that JTS did not exercise the six-month option? 
4. Did the District Court correctly award damages caused by JTS’s breach of the Lease? 
5. Did the District Court appropriately award attorney fees to CLC? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL (I.A.R. 35(b)(5)) 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-324, the “Enforcement Expenses” provision of the Lease, and 
Idaho Code § 12-120 (3), CLC respectfully requests the Court award it attorney fees for this appeal. 
ARGUMENT (I.A.R. 35(b)(6)) 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND JTS GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER 
AND CORRECTLY AWARDED DAMAGES UNDER I.C. § 6-316 AND 
CONSIDERED RELATED CONTRACT CLAIMS. 
 
The District Court did not exceed its jurisdiction by awarding damages for JTS’s unlawful 
detainer. The District Court also did not exceed its jurisdiction by considering provisions of the 
defaulted Lease and related claims for JTS’s breach of contract. In this case, JTS was found “guilty 
of unlawful detainer” under Idaho Code § 6-303and, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-316, the District 
Court correctly awarded damages in accordance with the Lease. 
In Idaho, unlawful detainer proceedings are not limited to a determination of a tenant’s 
right of possession. By statute, Idaho Code § 6-316 specifically “allows a landlord in an unlawful 
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detainer action to recover, in addition to possession of his property,” both “damages and rent found 
due.” Texaco, Inc. v. Johnson, 96 Idaho 935, 940, 539 P.2d 288, 293 (1975) (emphasis added); see 
also Brooks v. Coppedge, 71 Idaho 166, 170, 228 P.2d 248, 250 (1951) (stating, a landlord, who 
proves unlawful detainer, “is entitled to three things: [1] restitution of the premises, [2] rent then 
due and unpaid, and [3] any damages alleged and proven”). To determine the amount of rent and 
whether “damages are the proximate or direct result of the unlawful detention,” Texaco, 96 Idaho 
at 940, 539 P.2d at 293, a court may necessarily consider terms of the parties’ lease agreement. 
See Nicholson v. Coeur D’Alene Placer Mining Corp., 161 Idaho 877, 392 P.3d 1218 (2017).  
The phrase “special statutory proceeding,” used by JTS to describe an action for unlawful 
detainer,4 is borrowed from an old version of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 81(a) that was 
rescinded in 1975.5 Olson v. Bedke, 97 Idaho 825, 831, 555 P.2d 156, 162 (1976). This Court has 
since confirmed that a declaration of property ownership is not one of the remedies available for 
an unlawful detainer claim. Carter v. Zollinger, 146 Idaho 842, 845, 203 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2009); 
see also Richardson v. King, 51 Idaho 762, 766-67, 10 P.2d 323, 324-25 (1932). However, the 
Court has never diminished, let alone abrogated, the mandate of the Idaho legislature that 
[I]f the proceeding be for an unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform 
the conditions or covenants of the lease or agreement under which the property is 
held . . . the judgment shall also declare the forfeiture of such lease or agreement. 
The jury, or the court, if the proceeding be tried without a jury, shall also assess the 
damages occasioned to the plaintiff . . . by any forcible or unlawful detainer, alleged 
in the complaint and proved on the trial, and find the amount of any rent due, . . . 
and the judgment shall be rendered against the defendant guilty of the . . . unlawful 
                                               
4 Appellant’s Brief at 10 (heading). 
5 Rule 81(a) formerly stated that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure “do not govern the practice in 
any special proceedings[.]” Texaco, 96 Idaho at 938, 539 P.2d at 291. Today, the Rules “apply to 
apply to all civil and special statutory proceedings.” Id. at n. 3. 
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detainer, for the amount of the damages thus assessed, and of the rent found due. 
 
I.C. § 6-316 (emphasis added). 
In Carter (cited by JTS), the Court invoked the reasoning of Richardson (also cited by JTS) 
to reverse findings by the district court “concerning the nature and extent of the Respondents’ 
interest in the [subject] property [and] whether Appellants [were] estopped from denying any such 
interest . . .” 146 Idaho at 1245, 203 P.2d at 846. In both Carter and Richardson, the parties made 
competing arguments for ownership of the subject property, which the Court held could not be 
resolved through a claim for unlawful detainer. Id. at 1242-43, 843-44; Richardson, 51 Idaho at 
765-66, 10 P.2d at 323-24 (arguing that the transaction “amounted to a mortgage” instead of a 
landlord-tenant relationship). Because the district courts in both cases determined “that no 
landlord-tenant relationship exist[ed],” thus terminating the unlawful detainer claim, the Court was 
not asked—and it did not consider—whether the putative landlord was entitled to rent and damages 
under Idaho Code § 6-316. Carter, 146 Idaho at 844, 203 P.3d at 1243; Richardson, 51 Idaho at 
766-67, 10 P.2d at 324-25 (concluding that because “the relation of landlord and tenant did not 
exist, and, since no rental was alleged or proved, the [district] court of course could not find that 
the respondent was in default . . . or, as a tenant, obligated to give . . . any amount due”). 
In this case, unlike Carter and Richardson, there was never a dispute about ownership of 
the Property. Rather, JTS conceded that CLC was the owner and that a landlord-tenant relationship 
existed between them. E.g. Answer and Counterclaim at 2, ¶ 2 [R. 94].6 Indeed, the counterclaims 
                                               
6 Admitting CLC’s factual allegation that “[t]he actions complained herein relate to the Property 
owned by Caldwell Cattle [CLC] . . . and to a written contract, the Commercial Lease Agreement 
and Lease Amendments.” Am. Complaint (3/20/15) at 2, ¶ 3 [R. 51]. 
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asserted by JTS were premised on the Lease and tenancy with CLC. Id. at 10-13, ¶¶ 24-48 [R. 102-
05]. As such, the District Court appropriately considered (and found) that JTS was in default of 
the Lease and, therefore, liable to CLC for damages. See Carter, 146 Idaho at 845, 203 P.3d at 
1244 (stating that an unlawful detainer action should determine “whether the relation of landlord 
and tenant existed, and if so, whether the respondent was in default” (emphasis added) (quoting 
Richardson)). The damages the District Court awarded, specifically rent owed by JTS for 
preventing occupation after it vacated and CLC’s resulting liability to Peterbilt7 (discussed infra), 
were appropriate based on JTS’s unlawful detainer. Texaco, 96 Idaho at 940, 530 P.2d at 293 
(damages which are “the proximate or direct result of the unlawful detention” are recoverable for 
unlawful detainer); C. S. Patrinelis, Measure of Damages for Tenant’s Failure to Surrender 
Possession of Rented Premises, 32 A.L.R.2d 582 (1953) (damages may include losses “sustained 
for a period subsequent to the unlawful detainer because the premises remained unoccupied”).  
A. The District Court appropriately considered the parties’ contract claims 
because they concerned the landlord-tenant relationship. 
 
JTS argues that the District Court’s rulings on CLC’s related claims for breach of the Lease 
and on JTS’s counterclaims should nonetheless be stricken because they “go beyond ruling on the 
unlawful detainer issue.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. Yet, unlike Carter and Richardson, these claims 
are all based on the parties’ landlord-tenant relationship and, thus, were appropriately decided by 
the District Court with CLC’s unlawful detainer damages claim.  
The history of this case reveals that when the first complaint was filed, JTS still occupied 
                                               
7 Findings and Conclusions at 9. 
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the Property and represented it would not vacate by the noticed termination date. Complaint for 
Eviction at 7, ¶¶ 29-31 [R. 29]. In the complaint, CLC sought an order of restitution and damages 
per the unlawful detainer statute, Idaho Code § 6-301 et seq. Id. at 9, ¶ 38 [R. 31]. After the 
complaint was filed, JTS abruptly vacated (despite prior repeated notice that it would not). CLC 
then amended the complaint to reassert its claim for unlawful detainer damages, which continued 
accruing after JTS vacated (discussed infra). Am. Complaint at 13-15, ¶¶ 57-64 [R. 62-64]. 
Because a determination of JTS’s unlawful detainer and damages inherently concerned the Lease, 
both CLC and JTS asserted claims concerning the parties’ respective obligations under the Lease. 
Id. at 15-18, ¶¶ 65-77 [R. 64-66]; Answer and Counterclaim at 10-13, ¶¶ 24-48 [R. 102-05]. 
In Nicholson, this Court recently resolved the appeal of an unlawful detainer claim and 
related breach-of-contract and unjust enrichment claims concerning a land lease. 161 Idaho at 879, 
392 P.3d at 1220. There, the plaintiff-tenants asserted contract and promissory estoppel claims 
against the defendant-landlord for breach of an alleged right of first refusal in the sale of the 
property. Id. at 880, 1221. The tenants also asserted unjust enrichment claims against both the 
landlord and the codefendant-purchaser. Id. The tenants claimed that the landlord and purchaser 
would be unjustly enriched if they were ordered to vacate and unable to remove certain buildings, 
which they owned, from the land. Id. The purchaser also counterclaimed against the tenants for 
unlawful detainer. Id.; see also id. at 886, 1227 (finding the district court correctly characterized 
the purchaser’s counterclaim as one for unlawful detainer). The district court considered and 
dismissed the tenants’ claims and then entered judgment for the purchaser, finding the tenant guilty 
of unlawful detainer and awarding damages. Id. at 880, 1221. On appeal, the Court affirmed the 
17 
district court’s decisions (albeit affirming one decision by a different theory). Id. at 881-86, 1222-
27. The Court considered, among other things, the terms of the parties’ lease agreement to deny 
the tenants’ unjust enrichment claim. Id. at 884-86, 1225-27. With respect to the unlawful detainer 
claim, the Court rejected the tenants’ argument that the inclusion of damages was improper. Id. at 
886-87, 1227-28. The Court rebuffed the notion that related claims could not be considered in an 
unlawful detainer action. Id. (abrogating Coe v. Bennett, 39 Idaho 176, 226 P. 736 (1924)8). 
Relevant to this appeal, the Court did not hold that the unlawful detainer claim should have been 
decided in proceedings separate from the other claims. Id. The tenant in Nicholson did not claim 
an ownership interest in the property. Further, there was no issue whether the other claims were 
separately pleaded from the unlawful detainer claim.9 
Here, all claims concerned only the parties’ landlord-tenant relationship. Claims on both 
sides related to the Lease and JTS’s occupation of the Property as tenant. Moreover, CLC’s case 
for JTS’s breach of the Lease was pleaded in separate claims and supported by damages. Galindo 
v. Hibbard, 106 Idaho 302, 306-07, 678 P.2d 94, 98-99 (Ct. App. 1984) (consequential damages 
are recoverable for breach of contract); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 102, 730 
                                               
8 When Coe and Richardson were decided, unlawful detainer was a “summary proceeding” that 
did not belong in the same class of cases as other actions. Nicholson, 161 Idaho at 887, 1228. Thus, 
an unlawful detainer action was treated differently under the rescinded Rule 81(a), supra. The 
statutes relevant to Coe (1924) and Richardson (1932) have long since been repealed. Id. 
9 Notably, the tenants in Nicholson are distinguished from the putative tenants in Carter. In Carter, 
the putative tenants (the respondents in that case) did not assert any affirmative claims. Carter, 
146 Idaho at 844, 203 P.3d at 1243. Instead, the respondents simply motioned for summary 
dismissal, disputing that they were tenants. Id. Consequently, because the only claim in Carter 
was for unlawful detainer, the Court held that the district court’s additional findings regarding 
ownership were of no legal consequence as to other unpleaded claims. Id. at 846-47, 1245-46. 
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P.2d 1014, 1022 (1986) (same). Accordingly, like Nicholson, by determining the parties’ related 
breach-of-contract claims, the District Court did not exceed the scope of its jurisdiction. 
JTS avers that this Court’s Texaco decision nonetheless precludes all claims other than for 
unlawful detainer (including those affirmatively asserted—and lost—by JTS) from being tried in 
a single action. Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. This argument can be rejected for at least three reasons. 
First, the portion of Texaco JTS relies on, specifically the dismissal of the defendant-tenant’s 
counterclaim in that case,10 is abrogated by the holdings in Nicholson, the repeal of the statutes 
relied upon in Coe and Richardson,11 and the rescission of former Rule 81(a).12 Second, the 
dismissed counterclaim in Texaco did not concern the parties’ landlord-tenant relationship; rather, 
it alleged interference with the sale of the tenant’s business. Texaco, 96 Idaho at 936, 539 P.2d at 
289. Because the tortious interference claim was unrelated to the landlord-tenant relationship, the 
Court determined that it was an “extraneous issue.” Id. at 938, 291. In contrast, in this case, all 
claims decided by the District Court concerned the landlord-tenant relationship. Third, a special 
action and streamlined procedure for possession is contemplated by Idaho Code § 6-310. In this 
case, CLC did not plead, and the District Court did not conduct, a special short-form proceeding 
under that section. See I.C. § 6-310(4) (requiring a trial within 72 hours from the filing of the 
complaint); see also id. § 6-311E (stating that “the early trial provision of section 6-310 . . . shall 
not be applicable when an action for damages is combined with an action for possession”). Instead, 
                                               
10 Texaco, 96 Idaho at 937-38, 539 P.2d at 290-91; see also Willmore v. Christensen, 94 Idaho 262, 
263-64, 486 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1971). 
11 See footnote 8, supra. 
12 See footnote 5, supra; see also Olson, 97 Idaho at 831, 555 P.2d at 162. 
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CLC proceeded with claims for damages and breach of contract, which is allowed under modern 
pleading rules. I.R.C.P. 8(d) (allowing for pleading of multiple claims, regardless of consistency). 
Accordingly, the District Court did not exceed its subject-matter jurisdiction by deciding 
the unlawful detainer damages claim alongside the parties’ other related claims. The District Court 
properly determined that JTS was guilty of unlawful detainer and breached the Lease, and 
appropriately awarded CLC damages for both claims.  
B. The District Court properly awarded CLC special damages resulting from 
JTS’s unlawful detainer. 
 
JTS also argues that the District Court improperly awarded contract damages “unrelated to 
CLC’s unlawful detainer claim.” Appellant’s Brief at 18-21. To be sure, these damages are 
separately recoverable as consequential damages for JTS’s breach of contract (discussed infra).13 
However, the District Court properly awarded them as special damages for unlawful detainer 
because they were proximately caused by JTS’s failure to timely surrender possession of the 
Property, at least up through removing the Transformer, and beyond.14 
As cited above, this Court has recognized that damages which are “the proximate or direct 
result of the unlawful detention” are recoverable. Texaco, 96 Idaho at 940, 539 P.2d at 293. The 
Court has cited 32 A.L.R.2d 582 as “an excellent annotation on the measure of damages for a 
                                               
13 Damages for CLC’s successful claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith were decided under the same damages theory. Drug Testing Compliance Group, LLC 
v. DOT Compliance Serv., 161 Idaho 93, 103, 383 P.3d 1263, 1273 (2016); Idaho First Natl. Bank 
v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824 P.2d 841, 864 (1991). 
14 See CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 15 [R. 608] (showing how occupation by CLC’s new tenant, 
Peterbilt, was delayed: “first, by JTS’s refusal to vacate by January 31, 2015 . . . ; and second, by 
JTS’s instruction and removal of power in late February/early March . . .”). 
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tenant’s failure to surrender possession of rented premises.” Id. at n. 9. This annotation describes 
cases allowing both rent and special damages—consistent with Idaho Code § 6-316—for losses 
“suffered by [the landlord] as the result of the tenant’s failure to surrender the premises.” Patrinelis, 
32 A.L.R.2d 582 at § 9. Special damages for unlawful detention may include, among other things, 
lost rent from a new tenant, increased costs, and lost profits, including “for a period subsequent to 
the unlawful detainer because the premises remained unoccupied.” Id. at §§ 2, 9, and 10. 
Evidence at trial showed that when JTS was given notice to vacate in December 2014, CLC 
expected that its new tenant, Peterbilt, would occupy the Property immediately. CLC’s Closing 
Trial Brief at 13 [R. 606] (citing testimony); Memo. in Opp. to Defendant’s Mot. to Reconsider 
(“Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider”) at 26 [R. 885] (same). Because JTS refused to vacate the Property 
by January 31, 2015 (the date required by the Notice of Termination), Peterbilt was forced to 
extend its old lease the entire month of February. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 15 [R. 608]; CLC’s 
Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 26 [R. 885]. During that time, Peterbilt paid rent for its old lease, 
suffered lost profits from not being able to move into the Property, and incurred other costs because 
of the delay. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 15-16 [R. 608-09]. CLC demonstrated that it was liable 
to Peterbilt for these amounts under the Peterbilt Lease. Id. (showing that the Peterbilt Lease was 
entered before CLC closed on its purchase of the Property). The District Court appropriately 
awarded these amounts, viz., the damages resulting from the “first delay” caused by JTS for the 
month of February 2015, as special damages for JTS’s unlawful detainer. By unlawfully detaining 
the Property beyond the first of February, at least through the removal of the Transformer and the 
end of that month, JTS’s wrongful detention caused damages that were proven by CLC. Thus, the 
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District Court properly awarded damages. 
Further, JTS’s removal of the Transformer and the ensuing damages, viz., damages caused 
by the “second delay” for March and April 2015, can also be appropriately considered special 
damages resulting from JTS’s unlawful detainer. Evidence showed that JTS’s instruction to 
remove the Transformer occurred on February 23, 2018, in the days after JTS vacated, but before 
Peterbilt could move in because of JTS’s unlawful detention. CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider 
at 13 [R. 872] (citing testimony). Consequently, the damages incurred by CLC after the 
Transformer’s removal (including its resulting liability to Peterbilt for continued payments on the 
old lease, lost profits, and other costs, as well as unpaid rent by JTS through April 2015 when 
Peterbilt could move in), were recoverable as special damages after the Transformer’s removal. 
JTS extrapolates from Texaco that these damages are somehow not really “the proximate 
or direct result of [JTS’s] unlawful detention,” and that only rent is recoverable for the purported 
additional “twelve days” that JTS refused to leave through February 12, 2015. Appellant’s Brief at 
19-21. This is not the holding in Texaco, which confirmed that damages in addition to rent, are 
recoverable under Idaho Code § 6-316, supra. In that case, the Court affirmed the district court’s 
decision that the landlord’s construction of a temporary bulk plant, while the tenant remained in 
possession of the landlord’s plant, was not the natural and proximate result of the tenant’s unlawful 
detention. Texaco, 96 Idaho at 937, 940, 539 P.2d at 290, 293. However, the Court did not explain 
what facts at trial led the district court to make this decision, other than to say that “[t]he record 
support[ed] this conclusion.” Id. at 940, 293. In contrast, the District Court here did find that the 
above damages were the result of JTS’s unlawful detention. Findings and Conclusions at 7, 9 [R. 
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963, 965]. Unlike the landlord in Texaco, CLC did not seek recovery for constructing a new 
building (which the Texaco landlord presumably owned, made profits from, and could have sold). 
Significantly, the limited rent that JTS paid for February (less than what CLC would have received 
but for JTS’s unlawful detention15) did not absolve CLC of its liability to Peterbilt. In other words, 
the rent JTS paid through February was not a substitute for CLC’s damages. 
The record in this case supports the District Court’s conclusion that JTS’s unlawful detainer 
caused CLC to incur damages, including for a period beyond JTS’s occupation. As such, the 
District Court properly awarded damages under Idaho Code § 6-316 for JTS’s unlawful detention. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND JTS DID NOT EXERCISE 
THE SIX-MONTH OPTION AND, THUS, UNLAWFULLY DETAINED THE 
PROPERTY AND BREACHED THE LEASE. 
 
The District Court correctly determined that the Third Amendment was unambiguous and 
that JTS failed to exercise the six-month option. Findings and Conclusions at 5-7 [R. 961-63]. 
Thus, the District Court properly concluded JTS was guilty of unlawful detainer and breached the 
Lease by refusing to timely vacate the Property. Id. at 7-8 [R. 963-64].  
JTS asserts that the District Court’s finding is in error (and thereby attempts to avoid all 
liability for unlawful detainer and breach of contract) by claiming that it silently exercised the six-
month option by paying rent after the term of the Lease expired. Appellant’s Brief at 13-18. Yet, 
this argument disregards paragraph 4 of the Third Amendment, which expressly incorporated and 
reaffirmed all other provisions of the Lease, including the requirement that an extension must be 
                                               
15 See CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 19 (asserting, in the alternative, that CLC should at a minimum 
receive the rent that Peterbilt would have paid if it had been able to timely occupy the Property). 
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exercised in writing. Trial Ex. 3 at ¶ 4; Trial Ex. 1 at 2 (“Option to Renew”). This argument also 
ignores JTS’s conduct demonstrating that the limited payments it made were to carry on month to 
month so that JTS could leave when it wanted, not to extend the Lease for six months. Findings 
and Conclusions at 6-7 [R. 962-63]. Because JTS did not exercise the six-month option “in the 
manner specified by the parties’ contract[,]” the District Court correctly concluded that JTS was 
guilty of unlawful detainer and breached the Lease. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 
Idaho 304, 309, 160 P.3d 743, 748 (2007); see William B. Johnson, Sufficiency As to Method of 
Giving Oral or Written Notice Exercising Option to Renew or Extend Lease, 29 A.L.R.4th 903, § 
3 (1984) ( “to be effective, a notice exercising an option to renew must contain a definite statement 
of intent to renew in accordance with the terms specified for renewal by the underlying lease”). 
A. The District Court correctly determined that exercising the six-month option 
required written notice, which JTS did not provide. 
  
When JTS and Gilbert negotiated the Third Amendment, they expressly incorporated “[a]ll 
other terms and conditions of the Lease” that were not specifically amended. Trial Ex. 3 at ¶ 4. 
This included the requirement that an “Option to Renew” must be exercised in writing: 
Upon Lessor’s receipt of a written notice by [JTS] at least sixty (60) days prior to 
the expiration of this Lease Agreement, Lessor grants to [JTS] an option to renew 
this Lease . . .16 
 
Because JTS never provided written notice, the six-month option could not have been exercised. 
JTS attempts to inextricably wed this requirement for written notice to only the one-year 
extension that was originally provided in the Lease (see id.), claiming that the Third Amendment 
                                               
16 Trial Ex. 1 at 2 (emphasis added). 
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created a “third way” for JTS to renew by merely continuing to pay rent. Appellant’s Brief at 16.17 
In this manner, JTS attempts to bootstrap the Court’s decision in Dante v. Golas, which held that 
a purchase option was timely exercised by lessees. 121 Idaho 149, 150-51, 823 P.2d 183, 184-85 
(1992). JTS’s argument can be rejected for several reasons.  
First, the requirement for written notice is tied to an “Option to Renew,” which paragraph 
3 of the Third Amendment indisputably comprises. There is no language in the Lease or the Third 
Amendment that restricts the requirement for written notice to only one instance or type of renewal.  
Second, the six-month option in paragraph 3 of the Third Amendment is a modification of 
the second one-year renewal that was originally granted by the Lease. Trial Ex. 1 at 2 (granting 
“an additional two (2) terms of one (1) year each”). JTS exercised the first one-year renewal (the 
“First Amendment”), which extended the Lease to April 15, 2014. Trial Ex. 2. Instead of exercising 
the second renewal for a complete one-year term, JTS negotiated for a reduced six months through 
October 15, 2014, and then “for an additional period of either six (6) months or on a month to 
month basis” afterwards. Trial Ex. 3 at ¶ 1. Because the six-month option was thus part of the 
second one-year renewal in the Lease, it follows that the requirement for written notice applied.  
Third, the Court’s decision in Dante was about the timeliness of the lessees’ exercise of a 
purchase option before—not after—the end of a lease. 121 Idaho at 151, 823 P.2d at 185. In that 
case, the lessees twice exercised their option in writing. Id. Because the lessees’ exercise was clear 
and occurred before the lease expired, in light of the language of the option, which gave the lessees 
                                               
17 JTS argues that the “first way” was for a one-year extension as provided in the “Option to 
Renew” provision and that the “second way” was under the “Modification” provision of the Lease. 
See Trial Ex. 1 at 2, 5. 
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the right to purchase “[a]t the end of [the] lease,” the Court held that their written exercise was 
timely. Id. In contrast, in this case, JTS never sent any writing or gave any indication that the six-
month option was exercised, let alone before or “[a]t the conclusion of [the] lease extension [on 
October 15, 2014,]” as stated in the Third Amendment. Trial Ex. 3 at ¶¶ 1, 3. Instead, throughout 
its communications, JTS consistently provided exit dates less than six months, demonstrating that 
the six-month option had not been exercised. CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 6 [R. 885] 
(citing exhibits and testimony). At best, JTS can argue only that the 60-day notice requirement in 
the Lease’s “Option to Review” provision was modified by the phrase “[a]t the conclusion of this 
lease extension” in the Third Amendment. But, where JTS did not provide any written notice at 
all, either on or before October 15, 2014, its argument for a timely renewal of the six-month option 
necessarily fails. Contrast also Dennett v. Kuenzli, 131 Idaho 21, 24, 936 P.2d 219, 222 (1997) 
(considering the plaintiff’s timely written notice, given in accordance with the option agreement). 
Fourth, JTS’s argument that it could silently renew and receive the benefits of a six-month 
option, without committing to a full six-month renewal, smacks of bad faith. By belatedly claiming 
a silent exercise, without notice, in paying limited rent while simultaneously and consistently 
representing an exit date before the end of that six months, JTS violated the implied covenant of 
good faith (discussed infra). CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 6-8 [R. 599-601] (citing exhibits and 
testimony); CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 20-23 [R. 879-82] (same). The District Court 
agreed with CLC and found that JTS violated the implied covenant, thus precluding a 
determination that JTS exercised the six-month option. Findings and Conclusions at 8 [R. 964]. 
As such, the District Court correctly held that JTS did not exercise the six-month option in 
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accordance with the Lease. Id. at 5 [R. 961] (holding that the Lease “required any renewal, 
including a renewal under the Third Amendment, to be put in writing”). Instead, when the term of 
the Lease expired, JTS “carried on as a month-to-month or at will tenant after October 15, 2014.” 
Id. Later, when JTS refused to vacate after receiving the Notice of Termination, it committed 
unlawful detainer and breached the Lease. Id. at 8 [R. 964]. 
B. The District Court made correct factual findings that JTS did not intend to 
exercise the six-month option. 
 
Important to the District Court’s decision was evidence that JTS did not intend to renew 
the Lease for another six months; rather, the rent JTS paid after the term expired was consistent 
with JTS’s stated purpose of continuing month-to-month. Specifically, the District Court found: 
Until the present dispute arose, neither [JTS] nor Gilbert intended to renew the lease 
for a six-month term after October 15, 2014. They did not have an agreement to 
renew the lease. In discussions leading up to October 2014, [JTS] made clear that 
it intended to move out as soon as its new facility was finished. [JTS’s] proposed 
exit dates were all less than six months after October 15, 2014. Ms. Johnson told 
Mr. Hagood that after the lease expired in October 2014, [JTS] wanted to go “month 
to month for an additional 3-6 months.” []. [JTS’s] communications did not 
demonstrate intent to be any more than a month-to-month tenant after October 15, 
2014. Gilbert intended to sell the Property. [JTS’s] continued possession of the 
Property and Gilbert’s acceptance of the $6,000/month rent for [the two months of] 
November and December 2014 did not demonstrate an intent to extend the lease 
for six months. See 29 A.L.R.4th 903 (1984). [JTS] was a month-to-month tenant 
after October 15, 2014. This is consistent with [JTS’s] stated intent to vacate as 
soon as it could move to its new facility. 
 
Findings and Conclusions at 6-7 [R. 962-63]. Because these factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous, the Court can affirm the District Court’s decision that JTS was a holdover tenant and 
committed unlawful detainer and breached the Lease by refusing to timely vacate the Property. 
Big Wood Ranch, LLC v. Water Users’ Assn. of Broadford Slough and Rockwell Bypass Lat. 
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Ditches, Inc., 158 Idaho 225, 230, 345 P.3d 1015, 1020 (2015) (stating, “This Court will not set 
aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.”); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
When the term of a lease expires and a tenant continues to occupy the leased premises and 
pay rent, a new lease can arise by operation of law. Lewiston Pre-Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Rohde, 110 
Idaho 640, 644-45, 718 P.2d 551, 555-56 (Ct. App. 1985). Determining the type of tenancy, 
namely a “tenancy at sufferance, tenancy at will, periodic tenancy (month-to month or year-to-
year) or a fixed term tenancy[,]” requires the court to examine the parties’ intent. Id. at 645, 556. 
This examination necessarily involves a factual determination of the parties’ conduct. See id. 
(stating that “[a] court must look to the lessor’s intent, as revealed by either his words or his actions, 
to determine whether a new tenancy results”). This is consistent with the law in Idaho that 
modifying an existing contract or implying a new contract by actions of the parties involves a 
question of fact. Pocatello Hosp., LLC v. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 717-
19, 330 P.3d 1067, 1075-77 (2014) (recognizing that, in the absence of writing, a “trier of fact is 
permitted to infer mutual intent based upon the parties’ subsequent conduct” to determine whether 
a contract has been modified); Lawyers Title Co. of Idaho v. Jacobs, 102 Idaho 804, 806, 641 P.2d 
350, 352 (Ct. App. 1982) (stating that “[a] contract may be implied in fact by conduct of the 
parties”) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 408 P.2d 810 (1965)). 
In Lewiston, the Court of Appeals was confronted with determining whether a new lease 
arose between the plaintiff-lessee and the defendant-lessor. Id. at 644-45, 555-56. There, the lease 
(assumed by the lessee) allowed for a fixed-term renewal, provided the lessee complied with notice 
provisions which required written notice. Id. at 643, 554. Neither the lessee nor its predecessor 
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gave written notice; however, when the lease expired, the lessee continued to occupy the property 
and pay rent, which was accepted by the landlord. Id. The Court of Appeals held “that a new 
tenancy, implied from conduct, arose by operation of law.” Id. at 645, 556. Although the question 
before the Court did not require it to answer what type of tenancy arose,18 the Court suggested that 
this determination also required a factual finding implied by the conduct of the parties. See id.  
 Consistent with these authorities,19 the District Court, acting as the trier of fact in this case, 
found that JTS’s payment of rent for November and December 2014, two months after the term of 
the Lease expired, supra, gave rise to a month-to-month tenancy in line with JTS’s stated intent. 
Findings and Conclusions at 5-7 [R. 961-63]. The District Court expressly found that payment of 
rent was not evidence that JTS exercised the six-month option. Id. at 7 [R. 963]. These findings 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record, which is convincingly outlined 
in CLC’s Closing Trial Brief, and relied upon by the District Court (see id.), as follows (cited 
exhibits and testimony are removed for brevity): 
• The Third [] Amendment was entered with the understanding that JTS was 
constructing a new building and would vacate the Property as soon as that building 
was completed. []. JTS understood that upon vacating [Gilbert] expected to find a 
new tenant or purchaser []. 
 
• JTS had an option to extend the Lease for another full year through April15, 2015 
[], but instead requested a lesser term of six months with the option to go month to 
month afterwards. [] (“We [JTS] would like to do a 6 month lease with the option 
to go month to month for an additional 3-6 months” []. 
                                               
18 The appeal involved the lessee’s right to remove tenant improvements. Lewiston, 110 Idaho at 
556, 718 P.2d at 645. Because the Court of Appeals was concerned only with whether the lessee 
was a tenant, and thus entitled to rights under the lease agreement that carried over, the Court was 
not required to determine the type of new tenancy that arose. Id. 
19 See State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 378, 381, 413 P.3d 778, 782 (2018) (confirming “that precedent 
from [the Supreme] Court and the Court of Appeals is binding upon the district courts in Idaho”). 
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• On August 15, 2014, 60 days before the end of the Third [] Amendment, and within 
the [60-day written] notice period, supra, [Gilbert’s] agent, Lincoln Hagood, 
communicated with JTS to inquire about the status of completing the new building 
and to request an exit date. []. In response, JTS did not exercise the six-month 
option. []. 
 
• Later, in early October 2014, at the end of the Third [] Amendment, [Gilbert] listed 
the Property for sale because of JTS’s stated intent to leave. []. 
 
• When the Property was listed for sale, [Gilbert’s agent] specifically asked JTS to 
“keep [him] informed on [JTS’s] planned vacancy of the building.” []. JTS never 
informed Mr. Hagood that it might occupy the Property for another six months 
through April15, 2015. []. 
 
• Throughout its communications, JTS never expressed any written or oral intent to 
exercise the 6-month option []. Instead, JTS only communicated potential exit dates 
that were less than six months and before April15, 2015. [] (stating a potential 
December or January exit date); [] (stating a potential January or February exit 
date); [] (failing to correct [Gilbert’s agent’s] representation that JTS was “shooting 
for December 15th” to vacate) []. 
 
• JTS did not pay six months of rent through April 15, 2015 []. 
 
• The first time that JTS ever asserted it had purportedly exercised the six-month 
option, was in December 2014, after the Property was sold when JTS was informed 
that it would be required to vacate with 30-day notice. []. 
 
• The sole basis for JTS’s argument that the six-month option was exercised, was the 
payment of rent in the base amount of $6,000, plus triple-net expenses, for the 
months of November and December 2014. [] (arguing that JTS's “lease payments 
for Nov and Dec have been at the base rent for [the] six month period, not the higher 
month to month period”) []. However, these payments were sent to Arlene Gilbert 
(an elderly widow living in St. George, Utah []), and not to [Gilbert’s] agent, Mr. 
Hagood,[20] and were not accompanied with a written exercise of the option []. 
                                               
20 Mrs. Gilbert’s deposition testimony (admitted at trial) showed that she relied on her agent, Mr. 
Hagood, to make all decisions regarding the Property and that she had no communications with 
JTS or its principals about extending the Lease. Depo. of Arlene Gilbert at 49:18-50:6, 54:8-55:10, 
61:14-19 [Aug. 7-10]. JTS’s principals confirmed that they exclusively communicated with 
Gilbert’s agent about the Third [] Amendment [Tr. Vol. I, 6 (12:12-14), 11 (30:18-21), 13 (39:6-
10), 17 (54:22-55:7), 20 (65:2-66:8)]. Mrs. Gilbert was not aware of any modifications or 
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• While JTS belatedly asserted the six-month option had been exercised, internally, 
its principals stated that this argument was for gaining leverage to delay an eviction. 
[] (Dave Erlebach: “Good luck with that! It appears we have the option to extend 
the lease so we will exercise the option. If they evict us we will fight it which should 
take at least 6 months.”). JTS could not show its purported intent to exercise the 
six-month option before the Third [] Amendment expired []. 
 
• Before the threat of eviction, JTS never insisted upon staying on the Property for 
the duration of the six-month option though April 15, 2015 []. Afterwards, JTS 
continued to tie its exit to completing the new building and asserted an earlier exit 
date of March 1, 2015. []. 
 
CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 1-4 [R. 595-97] (citing exhibits and testimony); CLC’s Opp. to Mot. 
to Reconsider at 6-10 [R. 865-69] (same).  
In this appeal, JTS fails to cite any evidence to challenge the District Court’s findings or 
contest the above-summarized facts, let alone to satisfy the significant hurdle of Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 52(a).21 KDN Mgmt., Inc. v. WinCo Foods, LLC, 164 Idaho 1, 6, 423 P.3d 422, 
427 (2018) (“In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous this Court does not weigh the 
evidence. The Court inquires whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial and 
competent evidence.”). Because the record supports the District Court’s determination that JTS 
did not exercise the six-month option, but paid rent to carry over month-to-month, the District 
Court’s findings are not clearly erroneous. Because JTS refused to timely vacate, the District Court 
correctly concluded that it unlawfully detained the Property and breached the Lease. 
                                               
amendments to the Lease. Depo. of Arlene Gilbert at 33:13-19 [Aug. 4]. 
21 “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge 
the witnesses’ credibility.” I.R.C.P. 52(a)(7). 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND JTS LIABLE FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT, AND 
CORRECTLY AWARDED CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
 
As discussed above, the District Court correctly considered the parties’ contract claims 
(relating to their landlord-tenant relationship, supra) and found JTS liable for breaching the Lease. 
For JTS’s breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith, the District Court 
awarded CLC general and consequential damages. Findings and Conclusions at 8-9 [R. 964-65]. 
Separate from its unlawful detainer arguments, JTS asserts that the District Court erred by 
finding that JTS breached the implied covenant of good faith. Appellant’s Brief at 21-27. JTS also 
argues that the consequential damages awarded to CLC should be limited to JTS’s breach of 
contract and failure to timely vacate, and not its breach of the implied covenant. Id. at 27-34. 
JTS miscomprehends why the District Court found a breach of the implied covenant of 
good faith. Even assuming JTS could have exercised the six-month option without written notice 
simply by paying rent (it could not, supra), JTS breached the implied covenant by depriving 
Gilbert and CLC of the benefits of notice and rent and termination rights commensurate with JTS’s 
occupation, as contemplated by the Lease. JTS evidenced bad faith by belatedly claiming exercise 
of the six-month option, not for purpose of occupying the Property an additional six months, but 
to leverage against a valid Notice of Termination22 while simultaneously paying less rent. 
JTS also miscomprehends how the District Court awarded damages according to provisions 
of the Lease, which carried over into JTS’s holdover tenancy. Because JTS entered the Property 
                                               
22 Significantly, JTS does not challenge the form of the Notice of Termination or whether it was 
properly given under Idaho § 55-208. Trial Ex. 13. JTS only claims that the six-month option was 
exercised (it was not) and thus it was not required to vacate the Property by January 31, 2015. 
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and removed the Transformer without notice or the consent of CLC, as required under the Lease, 
JTS breached the Lease and caused significant damages, including CLC’s resulting liability to 
Peterbilt. Under the Lease’s indemnity provisions, JTS assumed liability for the damages to CLC 
that JTS caused. Further, because JTS did not pay for repairs to the Property, JTS also breached 
the Lease’s maintenance provision and owed CLC for completing the unpaid repairs. 
A. The District Court correctly found that JTS breached the implied covenant. 
 
Under Idaho law, “[i]n every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, which ‘requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations required by their 
agreement.’” Drug Testing Compliance Group, 161 Idaho at 102-03, 383 P.3d at 1272-73 (quoting 
Silicon Intl. Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538, 552, 314 P.3d 593, 607 (2013)). “A 
violation of the covenant occurs when either party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any 
benefit of the contract.” Id. (quoting Idaho First Natl. Bank, 121 Idaho at 289, 824 P.2d at 864). 
CLC’s claim for breach of the implied covenant was asserted in this case in the alternative. 
CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 21 [R. 880]; see also I.R.C.P. 8(d)(3). Specifically, even if 
JTS could convince the District Court (which it did not, supra) that the six-month option was 
exercised in accordance with the Lease, JTS still breached the implied covenant; first, by 
nullifying, or at least significantly impairing, Gilbert’s right (CLC’s right as successor) to actual 
notice when JTS would leave; and second, by depriving Gilbert and CLC of the higher rent that 
JTS agreed to pay for the month-to-month option in the Third Amendment. 
As demonstrated at trial and explained in CLC’s briefing to the District Court, the Third 
Amendment was the product of JTS’s insistence—not Gilbert—to remain on the Property only so 
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long as necessary to complete its new building. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 6 [R. 599] (citing 
testimony); CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 21 [R. 880] (same). In exchange for a lesser term 
than the second one-year renewal (which contemplated only a six-month renewal followed by the 
option to extend for six months or month-to-month), Gilbert had a reasonable expectation of notice 
from JTS about its exit date. This was evidenced by provisions from the Lease that were 
incorporated by the Third Amendment. Trial Ex. 3 at ¶ 4; Trial Ex. 1 at 1-3 (“Term of Lease,” 
“Option to Renew,” and “Time of the Essence”). The expectation of actual notice was confirmed 
in communications by Gilbert’s agent. Trial Exs. 5-7. Relying on JTS’s representations that it was 
leaving in December or January, Gilbert listed the Property for sale in October 2014. Trial Ex. 7.  
Knowing that the Property was listed for sale in October 2014, JTS had a good faith 
obligation to give notice whether it would extend the Lease and for how long. By claiming a silent 
exercise of the six-month option without any written notice, and by paying Mrs. Gilbert (an elderly 
widow residing in St. George, Utah) while simultaneously and consistently representing an exit 
before the end of that six months, JTS deprived Gilbert and CLC of the right to actual notice when 
JTS would leave.23 CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 7 [R. 600]; CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 
22 [R. 881]. Further, by belatedly claiming a right to possess the Property for the duration of the 
six-month option (through April 15, 2015), while at the same time asserting termination sometime 
before that date, JTS deprived Gilbert and CLC of the higher rent that JTS agreed to pay in 
                                               
23 Had JTS given notice that it would exercise the six-month option, the Property likely would not 
have been listed for sale until later. But, when the Property was listed and sold in November, JTS 
did not represented to CLC that it would remain through April 2015. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 
7 [R. 600] (citing testimony); CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 22 [R. 881] (same). 
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exchange for the month-to-month option. Trial Ex. 3 at ¶ 3(b). In remaining silent, JTS hoped to 
both continue paying a lesser monthly rent and avoid committing to pay full rent for the next six 
months. This impaired Gilbert and CLC’s right to a full six months’ rent, which otherwise would 
have been due had JTS given notice for the six-month option. Id. Before the threat of eviction, JTS 
never insisted on staying for the full six-month option. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 7 [R. 600]; 
CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 23 [R. 882]. Afterwards, JTS continued to tie its departure to 
completing its new building and gave conflicting exit dates, which further impaired the landlord’s 
right to terminate the Lease in a planned and orderly manner, which otherwise would have been 
completed by January 31, 2015. Id. 
For these reasons, the District Court correctly found that JTS breached the implied 
covenant of good faith. By failing to vacate the Property and pay rent through April 2015, JTS 
damaged CLC. The damages the District Court awarded for JTS’s breach of the implied covenant 
were correctly included as the same damages for JTS’s unlawful detention, supra, and for its 
breach of express provisions of the Lease. See Drug Testing Compliance Group, 161 Idaho at 103, 
383 P.3d at 1273. In other words, the District Court did not award duplicate damages caused by 
JTS’s refusal to timely vacate or pay rent. Findings and Conclusions at 9 [R. 965]. 
1. The District Court’s determination that JTS breached the implied covenant 
is not incompatible with other rulings. 
 
JTS argues that the District Court’s finding JTS breached the implied covenant for the 
reasons above is “incongruous” with its determination that JTS did not renew the six-month option. 
Appellant’s Brief at 27-28. Again, JTS miscomprehends the District Court’s decision. 
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Breach of the implied covenant was asserted in the alternative. Even if JTS could have 
exercised the six-month option without written notice simply by paying rent (it could not, supra), 
JTS still breached the Lease by depriving the landlord of actual notice when it would exit. Had 
JTS been frank about its intentions, either to renew the Lease and pay full rent through April 2015 
or to continue month to month and peaceably exit with 30-day notice, then an orderly and planned 
transfer of the Property could have occurred. Instead, JTS played both sides, hedging against a full 
six-month commitment while paying lesser rent. The District Court correctly rejected JTS’s action. 
Furthermore, as stated above, the District Court did not award duplicate damages for JTS’s 
breach. The remedy for breach of the implied covenant is the same for breach of contract. Drug 
Testing Compliance Group, 161 Idaho at 103, 383 P.3d at 1273. 
Accordingly, the District Court’s determination that JTS breached the implied covenant of 
good faith and award of damages was not in error. 
B. The District Court correctly determined that JTS violated provisions of the 
Lease, which carried over, and assumed liability, and therefore properly 
awarded consequential damages to CLC. 
 
The District Court awarded damages to CLC through the end of February 2015 because 
occupation of the Property by CLC’s new tenant, Peterbilt, was delayed by JTS’s refusal to timely 
vacate (the “first delay”).24 The District Court also awarded damages after February because 
occupation was further delayed by JTS’s instruction to remove the Transformer (the “second 
delay”). Because the District Court correctly determined that provisions of the Lease carried over 
                                               
24 See footnote 14, supra. 
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into JTS’s holdover tenancy, the District Court appropriately awarded consequential damages for 
both the first delay and the second delay caused by JTS. 
In addition to damages for unlawful detainer, supra, a holdover tenant can also be 
contractually liable for general and consequential damages resulting from the breach of a lease. 
Lamb v. Robinson, 101 Idaho 703, 705, 620 P.2d 276, 278 (1980); Galindo, 106 Idaho at 306-07, 
878 P.2d at 98-99; see also Idaho First Natl. Bank, 121 Idaho at 289, 824 P.2d at 864 (same for 
breach of the implied covenant). Consequential damages, including lost profits, are recoverable if 
“[t]hey are, first, . . . proved with reasonable certainty, and second, . . . within the contemplation 
of the parties.” Circle C Ranch Co. v. Jayo, 104 Idaho 353, 356, 659 P.2d 107, 111 (1983); 
Galindo, 106 Idaho at 307, 878 P.2d at 99. The test for “reasonable certainty” requires only that 
damages be taken out of the realm of speculation. Id. Consequential damages are recoverable if 
they are “reasonably foreseeable and within the contemplation of the parties at the time they made 
the contract.” Garcia v. Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC, 161 Idaho 616, 622, 389 P.3d 161, 167 (2016) 
(quoting Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 22, 713 P.2d 1374, 1381 (1985)). 
(Significantly, however, as distinguished from consequential damages for breach of contract, a 
reasonable understanding of the parties at the time of contract is not required to show special 
damages for unlawful detainer. See Brooks, 71 Idaho at 170, 228 P.2d at 250.) 
As discussed above, the District Court correctly determined that because JTS did not 
exercise the six-month option it was as a month-to-month tenant after October 2014. Though the 
term expired, the Lease’s provisions carried over into JTS’s new tenancy with Gilbert and then 
CLC. Lewiston, 110 Idaho at 645, 718 P.2d at 556 (“[t]he terms of the new lease are usually carried 
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over into the new tenancy”); see also Pearson v. Harper, 87 Idaho 245, 255, 392 P.2d 687, 692 
(1964) (tenant’s possession, holding over after expiration of a lease, “was no more than a 
continuance of the original term”). JTS concedes this point. Appellant’s Brief at 22 (asserting that 
provisions of the Lease carried over). The provisions of the Lease that carried over included: 
Surrender of Premises: Upon the expiration of this agreement, [JTS] shall quit 
and surrender the premises in the same state of condition, reasonable wear and tear 
expected, that the premises was in at the beginning of this Agreement. . . . 
 
Trial Ex. 1 at 5; see also id. (“Time is of the essence”). 
Improvements: [JTS] shall not reconstruct, remodel or change any part of the 
premises without the consent of the Lessor . . . 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Lability Insurance: . . . [JTS] agrees to indemnify and hold Lessor harmless from 
any damages, suits, judgments, liabilities or expenses arising from the use or 
occupancy of the premises by [JTS], [JTS’s] agents, . . . or [JTS’s] guests caused 
by either negligent or intentional acts. 
 
Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
Indemnification of Lessor: [JTS] shall indemnify Lessor against liability on all 
claims for damages and injuries to persons or property that are claimed to have 
resulted from the activities or omissions of [JTS] . . . 
 
Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 When JTS refused to vacate by January 31, 2015, according to the Notice of Termination, 
JTS violated its obligation to timely surrender the Property. The evidence showed that JTS’s 
breach caused CLC to incur liabilities discussed above, namely its resulting liability to Peterbilt, 
the new tenant, because the Property was unavailable at the start of February. As a commercial 
tenant leasing the Property under a “Commercial Lease Agreement” with obligations to indemnify 
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the Lessor, JTS reasonably contemplated at the time of contracting that its breach would cause 
such damages to the landlord. See Lamb, 101 Idaho at 705, 620 P.2d at 278; Galindo, 106 Idaho 
at 306-07, 678 P.2d at 98-99. Indeed, when JTS negotiated the Third Amendment, it expressly 
understood that the landlord desired to have a new tenant “tak[e] the space over from [JTS]” as 
soon as it vacated.” CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 16 [R. 875] (citing exhibits and 
testimony). For this reason, throughout the extended term of the Lease, Gilbert’s agent inquired 
several times about the status of JTS’s exit. Id. 
 The evidence showed that after JTS refused to vacate, and in the immediate days after it 
abruptly abandoned, but before Peterbilt could move in, JTS instructed Idaho Power to remove the 
Transformer. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 14 [R. 607] (citing exhibits and testimony); CLC’s Opp. 
to Mot. to Reconsider at 16 [R. 875] (same). This was also a violation of the Lease, specifically 
the “Improvements” provision (quoted supra), which required CLC’s consent to make changes to 
the Property. Trial Ex. 1 at 3. Because of this violation and removal of power, Peterbilt could not 
occupy the Property for another two months through April 2015, which caused additional damages. 
CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 15-16 [R. 609-10]; CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 16 [R. 875]. 
Again, by including this provision in the Lease, along with the other provisions for indemnity, JTS 
reasonably contemplated at the time of contract that such a violation would cause damages. 
Therefore, the District Court appropriately awarded consequential damages for JTS’s 
breaches of contract and violations of the Lease that carried over. JTS, as suggested by its own 
protest before leaving, understood that delay and causing a new tenant to operate without a building 
would cause “economic damage.” Trial Ex. 9 at 3. Because JTS expressly agreed to indemnify the 
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landlord against damages and liabilities caused by its actions, JTS reasonably contemplated CLC’s 
resulting liability to Peterbilt according to its own lease agreement (the Peterbilt Lease). See CLC’s 
Closing Trial Brief at 16 [R. 609] (explaining the basis for CLC’s resulting liability to Peterbilt). 
Despite the foregoing, JTS argues that even though provisions of the Lease carried over, it 
was nonetheless entitled to remove the Transformer as a temporary improvement or trade fixture,25 
and, therefore, damages resulting from the loss of power are not recoverable. Appellant’s Brief at 
23-27. JTS focuses on the circumstances of installing the Transformer and whether it was 
considered a permanent improvement to the Property. Id. at 24-25. These arguments fail because 
they ignore the specific breach of the “Improvements” provision for which the District Court found 
JTS liable. Specifically, the District Court found JTS liable, not because the Transformer was 
considered an improvement, but because JTS failed to get permission to “change any part of the 
premises.” Trial Ex. 1 at 3. The District Court found: 
 [JTS] is liable for breach of contract because it failed to vacate the Property after 
its term expired; [and] removed the transformer after the term expired and without 
[CLC’s] permission . . . 
 
Findings and Conclusions at 8 [R. 964] (citing “Improvements,” quoted supra) (emphasis added).  
The evidence showed that when JTS gave instruction to remove the Transformer, it knew 
Idaho Power would enter the Property. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 14 [R. 607] (citing exhibits 
                                               
25 Notably, in making this argument, JTS contradicts the claim that it had completely vacated the 
Property on February 12, 2015. Appellant’s Brief at 21. The instruction to remove the Transformer 
was made on February 23, 2015, and the Transformer itself was not removed until later at the end 
of the month. CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 14-15 [R. 607-08] (citing exhibits and testimony). By 
claiming that it was entitled to remove the Transformer as a temporary fixture, JTS necessarily 
concedes that it had not completely vacated the Property. 
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and testimony); CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 17 [R. 876] (same). JTS also testified it 
understood CLC’s permission was required. Id. Even so, JTS failed to inform CLC that Idaho 
Power would be entering the Property and tearing out the Transformer, removing power, and 
leaving a hole in the parking lot.26 Id. Regardless who owned the Transformer (Idaho Power) or 
whether it was considered a temporary improvement or trade fixture, these were indisputably 
changes to the Property that required CLC’s consent under the “Improvements” provision of the 
Lease, which JTS did not obtain. Id. But for JTS’s request, Idaho Power would not have entered 
the Property to remove the power. Id. Had Idaho Power known that JTS did not have the consent 
of the landlord, it would not have entered the Property, but contacted CLC. Id. Had CLC been 
contacted, it would have arranged for the Transformer to remain so that power to the Property 
could be preserved, which Idaho Power would have accommodated. Id. Instead, because of JTS’s 
instruction, power was removed and not restored until the end of April 2015, thus precluding 
Peterbilt’s occupation of the Property and causing CLC to incur additional liability. Id. 
The District Court’s award of consequential damages for JTS’s breach of the Lease (in 
addition to special damages for JTS’s unlawful detention, supra), is thus supported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record. The District Court specifically identified the provisions of 
the Lease that carried over and which JTS violated. Findings and Conclusions at 8-9 [R. 964-65]. 
                                               
26 JTS briefly argues that the Notice of Termination, Trial Ex. 13, should somehow be construed 
as an instruction to JTS to remove the Transformer. Appellant’s Brief at 26. Not only does the 
Notice of Termination say nothing about the Transformer, it certainly cannot be construed to have 
allowed JTS to leave holes in the building and a giant hole in the parking lot, which did not exist 
at the commencement of the Lease. CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 17 [R. 876] (comparing 
Trial Exs. 220 and 286 and related testimony). 
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The District Court also specifically identified the provisions of the Lease, including the indemnity 
provisions, that justified the award of consequential damages. Id. (citing “Indemnity” provisions, 
quoted supra). As such, the Court should uphold the District Court’s judgment. 
1. The District Court properly awarded damages for rent due. 
 
JTS challenges the District Court’s award of damages for rent due through April 2015, 
claiming that this award is incompatible with the expired term of the Lease in October 2014. 
Appellant’s Brief at 30. First, as discussed above, an award of rent is allowed under Idaho § 6-316 
for unlawful detainer. Second, with respect to contract damages, because of JTS’s breaches, CLC 
was prevented from having its new tenant, Peterbilt, occupy the Property. Instead of receiving rent 
from Peterbilt starting February 1, 2015, under the Peterbilt Lease, CLC was unable to rent the 
Property and became liable to Peterbilt for the delay. CLC requested, in the alternative and at a 
minimum, the rent that Peterbilt would have paid had it been able to timely occupy the Property. 
CLC’s Closing Trial Brief at 19 [R. 612]. The District Court did not grant this alternative minimum 
but awarded CLC consequential damages of (a) unpaid rent through April 2015 that JTS caused 
and would have paid (i.e. the rent due) and (b) CLC’s resulting liability to Peterbilt. Because the 
Court did not grant the alternative minimum, there is nothing incompatible or duplicative with the 
award of damages including rent due. The award is proper. (Coincidentally, if JTS had exercised 
the six-month option, it would have been required to pay this same rent plus the costs of repairs.) 
2. JTS does not challenge the award of damages for repairs. 
 
JTS does not challenge the District Court’s award of damages for repairs. Appellant’s Brief 
at 31. As such, the District Court’s decision stands. 
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3. The District Court properly awarded damages for CLC’s liability to Peterbilt. 
 
JTS’s last argument for reducing damages questions the purported standing of Peterbilt to 
claim injury in this action. Id. at 31-32. The District Court correctly decided that this case did not 
present an issue of Peterbilt’s standing or privity vis-à-vis JTS, but concerned CLC’s damages, 
including its liability to Peterbilt because of JTS’s misdeeds. Findings and Conclusions at 4, 9 [R. 
960, 965]; see also CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 24 [R. 883]; CLC’s Memo. in Opp. to 
Defendant’s Mot. in Limine [R 545-55]; Mot. [in Limine] Denied [R. 15] (denying JTS’s pretrial 
motion to exclude damages concerning CLC’s liability to Peterbilt). 
At trial, the unrebutted testimony of CLC’s principal confirmed that the Peterbilt Lease 
was entered before CLC closed on the Property. CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 24 [R. 883] 
(citing exhibits and testimony). Otherwise, CLC could not have obtained outside financing to 
close. Id. Thereafter, CLC’s obligations to Peterbilt under the Peterbilt Lease commenced on 
February 1, 2015, corresponding with the termination date in the Notice of Termination. Id. When 
JTS refused to vacate, and unlawfully detained the Property and breached the Lease, Peterbilt 
could not take possession and was forced to extend its old lease. Id. Later, when JTS instructed 
Idaho Power to cancel services and the Transformer was removed, Peterbilt was forced again to 
extend the old lease until April 2015. Id. During this time, Peterbilt paid the mortgage on the 
Property for CLC (because there was no occupying tenant paying rent) and also continued to pay 
rent and utilities under the old lease. Id. Because the old lease was in a smaller building, Peterbilt’s 
planned expansion was delayed and it lost profits. Id. at 24-25 [R. 883-84]. Peterbilt also incurred 
the cost of an idle employee, who had been hired to work at the expanded location. Id. at 25 [R. 
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885]. Peterbilt also paid for Idaho Power to restore power to the Property. Id. According to the 
Peterbilt Lease, as well as CLC and Peterbilt’s unrebutted course of dealing, CLC was liable for 
these costs incurred because of Peterbilt’s delayed occupation. Id. n. 16 (citing provisions of the 
Peterbilt Lease that impose liability on CLC for JTS’s actions). The District Court correctly found 
that JTS reasonably anticipated and was obligated to indemnify CLC under the Lease for the 
resulting liability to Peterbilt that CLC incurred. Findings and Conclusions at 9 [R. 965].  
JTS’s remaining comments about damages after removing the Transformer are more of the 
same argument that JTS should only be liable for damages caused by the “first delay.” Appellant’s 
Brief at 32-34. As discussed above, the first delay caused CLC to incur liability to Peterbilt for all 
of February 2015 (not just twelve days) because the Property was unavailable at the beginning of 
the month and Peterbilt had to extend its old lease an entire month. Moreover, the evidence at trial 
was that JTS provided no notice when it abruptly left (after repeatedly declaring that it would not 
vacate).27 There was no showing that Peterbilt could have immediately entered the Property on 
February 13, 2015, let alone without notice. See CLC’s Opp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 18 [R. 877] 
(showing that JTS failed to satisfy its burden of proof on mitigation of damages). Thus, JTS’s self-
serving twelve-day calculations for the first delay should be rejected.  
For the reasons above, the District Court also correctly determined that JTS is liable for 
damages caused by the “second delay” and removing the Transformer without CLC’s consent. 
                                               
27 There was conflicting testimony whether JTS vacated on February 12, 2015. CLC’s Opp. to 
Mot. to Reconsider at 12 n. 8 [R. 871] (citing testimony). Because JTS did not give notice, CLC 
only discovered that JTS had abandoned the Property on February 17, 2015. Id. The District Court 
found that JTS vacated “on or about February 15, 2015.” Findings and Conclusions at 3 [R. 959]. 
44 
Therefore, the District Court properly calculated and awarded damages for CLC’s resulting 
liability to Peterbilt. Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 415 P.2d 48 (1966) (holding 
that an award of damages for breach of contract supported by competent and substantial evidence 
would not be set aside on appeal); see also Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 
846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007). The District Court’s award of damages should be upheld. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT JTS DID NOT 
SUCCEED ON ITS COUNTERCLAIMS AND CORRECTLY DENIED THE 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER. 
 
JTS does not challenge the District Court’s findings denying JTS’s affirmative defenses. 
Findings and Conclusions at 9 [R. 965] (finding that JTS did not prove a mitigation defense and 
its other defenses were unsupported). As such, denial of JTS’s affirmative defenses stands. 
In brief arguments, JTS asserts that the District Court erred by finding JTS failed on its 
counterclaims and that the District Court should have granted JTS’s motion to reconsider. 
Appellant’s Brief at 34-35. These arguments are merely a rehash of JTS’s previous arguments. 
Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed above, the District Court’s decisions were correct. 
V. THE DISTRICT COURT APPROPRIATELY AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES 
UNDER I.C. § 6-324 AND THE LEASE. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, the District Court found JTS guilty of unlawful detainer 
and correctly awarded damages under Idaho Code § 6-316. The District Court also correctly 
considered the parties’ related claims under the Lease, correctly determined that JTS breached the 
same, and correctly awarded consequential damages to CLC. Therefore, because Idaho Code § 6-
324 provides for a mandatory award of attorney fees in an action for unlawful detainer damages, 
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and because Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) and the Lease provide an additional basis for 
attorney fees by contract, the District Court appropriately awarded fees to CLC as the prevailing 
party. Furthermore, because the District Court awarded fees pursuant to a reasoned decision and 
in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (e)(3), the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining the amount. 
The award of attorney fees in civil actions “rests in the sound discretion of the [trial] court.” 
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 873, 421 P.3d 187, 204 (2018) (quoting Burns v. Cty. 
of Boundary, 120 Idaho 623, 625, 818 P.2d 327, 329 (Ct. App. 1990)). “[T]he burden is on the 
appellant [the disputing party] to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.” Elec. 
Whole. Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 824, 41 P.3d 242, 252 (2001). In determining 
whether a trial court has properly exercised its discretion to award attorney fees, this Court has 
described a four-party inquiry that considers the following: 
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its 
decision by the exercise of reason. 
 
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 873, 421 P.3d at 204. 
Considering the above factors, the District Court appropriately awarded attorney fees in 
this case. First, the District Court, by its order, correctly perceived the award as a matter of 
discretion. Order Awarding Fees at 3 [R. 976]. While attorney fees under the unlawful detainer 
46 
statute are mandatory,28 and similarly are compulsory under the Lease,29 the District Court 
recognized that determining the prevailing party “is a discretionary matter, based on the overall 
outcome of the entire action.” Id. (citing, among other authorities, I.R.C.P. 54 (d)(1)(B); Poole v. 
Davis, 153 Idaho 604, 606, 288 P.3d 821, 823 (2012)). In this case, JTS agreed—and it cannot be 
legitimately disputed—that CLC prevailed at trial. Order Awarding Fees at 3 [R. 976]; see also 
Memo. in Support of Mot. to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees at 2 [R. 711] (stating that “[JTS] 
does not dispute that Plaintiff [CLC] is the prevailing party pursuant to the Court’s Findings and 
Conclusions”). The District Court also recognized that determining the amount of reasonable fees 
was committed to its discretion. Order Awarding Fees at 6 [R. 979] (citing E. Idaho Agric. Credit 
Assn. v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 411, 987 P.2d 314, 323 (1999)). 
Second, the District Court appropriately acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion. 
The District Court awarded fees according to both the unlawful detainer statute and the Lease. 
With respect to the former, the District Court found JTS guilty of unlawful detainer and awarded 
damages, and specifically cited Idaho Code § 6-324 as a basis for fees. Order Awarding Fees at 6 
[R. 979]. The District Court also specifically cited the provision of the Lease, “Enforcement 
Expenses,” which allows for fees. Id. at 5 [R. 978]. In determining a reasonable amount of fees, 
the District Court considered the results achieved by CLC, the prevailing party, and the $86,389.26 
                                               
28 “In any action brought under the provisions of this chapter . . . the prevailing party shall be 
entitled to an award of attorney fees.” I.C. § 6-324 (emphasis added). 
29 “Enforcement Expenses: The losing party in any court action brought to enforce any of the 
provisions of or to collect any sums due under the terms of this Agreement [the Lease] shall pay 
the prevailing party in such action in all trial and appellate courts, a reasonable attorneys’ fee to 
be fixed by such court, in addition to the costs allowed by law.” Trial Ex. 1 at 5 (emphasis added). 
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damages award it obtained. Id. at 7 [R. 980]. Significantly, the District Court was not constrained 
to making the award of fees proportional to the award of damages. Elec. Whole., 136 Idaho at 824, 
41 P.3d at 252 (citing e.g. Lunders v. Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 699, 963 P.2d 372, 382 (1998); 
Meldco, Inc. v. Hollytex Carpet Mills, Inc., 118 Idaho 265, 271, 796 P.2d 142, 148 (Ct. App. 
1990)). JTS put up an aggressive defense in this case, both before and after trial, which demanded 
substantial attention by CLC. See generally Case Summary [R. 2-22]. 
Third, for substantially the same reasons, the District Court applied the correct legal 
standard and cited the specific choices available under the unlawful detainer statute and the Lease 
that support an award of attorney fees. Id. 
Fourth, after determining that CLC is entitled to fees, the District Court considered the 
factors set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (e)(3). Id. at 6-7. Based upon these factors, 
the above-cited statute and rules, the Lease, and a review of the case record (which included 
discovery, a trial, and several pre- and post-trial motions), the District Court reasoned that 
$150,000 is an appropriate award of attorney fees (reduced from $200,579 actually incurred by 
CLC) according to the work record submitted by CLC’s counsel. Id.; Memo. of Attorney Fees and 
Costs [R. 627-704]; Reply Brief in Supp. of Memo. of Attorney Fees and Costs [R. 772-80]; Suppl. 
Memo. of Attorney Fees and Costs [R. 906-21].  
Despite the foregoing, JTS argues that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding 
fees after the date that CLC supposedly recovered possession of the Property and by awarding fees 
for successfully prosecuting and defending claims under the Lease. Appellant’s Brief at 36-37. 
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Regarding the former argument, the District Court correctly rejected the same30 and ruled that 
damages obtained under Idaho Code § 6-316 properly fall within “the provisions of [the] chapter” 
for unlawful detainer, and, therefore, justify an award of attorney fees. I.C. § 6-324. With respect 
to the latter argument, as discussed above, the District Court correctly considered the parties’ 
related contract claims, found JTS liable for breach, and awarded damages to CLC. Thus, attorney 
fees were also appropriately awarded according to the Lease. Because the Lease in this case was a 
commercial transaction, attorney fees were additionally proper under Idaho Code § 12-120 (3).31 
Pocatello Hosp., 157 Idaho at 743, 339 P.3d at 1147. The District Court was not required to 
apportion fees according to claims; especially where CLC prevailed on both claims for unlawful 
detainer damages and breach of contract.32 Advanced Med. Diagnostics, LLC v. Imaging Ctr. of 
Idaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 815-16, 303 P.3d 171, 174-75 (2013); see also Meldco, 118 Idaho at 
271, 796 P.2d at 148 (confirming that fees should not be calculated according to “individual 
prevailing and nonprevailing ‘theories[;]’ [r]ather, the amount should be determined by the 
appropriate application of the factors enunciated in I.R.C.P. 54 (e)(3)”). 
JTS additionally argues that the Lease cannot be a basis for fees because the District Court 
held that the term expired when JTS did not exercise the six-month option. Appellant’s Brief at 38. 
Yet, JTS concedes that provisions of the Lease carried over into its holdover tenancy. Id. at 22 
(citing Lewiston, 110 Idaho at 646, 718 P.2d at 557); see also Findings and Conclusions at 6 [R. 
                                               
30 Memo. in Supp. of Mot. to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees at 6-7 [R. 715-16]. 
31 Answer and Counterclaim at 13, ¶ 47 [R. 105]. 
32 True, CLC was not successful in its final claim for malicious injury. However, the District Court 
properly acknowledged as much and nonetheless awarded fees according to the prevailing claims 
for unlawful detainer damages and breach of contract. Order Awarding Fees at 7 [R. 980].  
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962] (citing Lewiston). These carried-over provisions necessarily included the fee provision, which 
the District Court cited in its order. Order Awarding Fees at 5 [R. 978]. Significantly, JTS cited 
the Lease and the fee provision as the basis for its own fee request, which, had JTS prevailed, it 
would not argue was unenforceable.33 Answer and Counterclaim at 13, ¶ 47 [R. 105] (claiming 
entitlement to attorney fees under “Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3), . . . 6-324, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54, and the express terms of the Lease at page 5 ‘Enforcement Expenses’”). 
Finally, JTS avers that CLC’s memorandum of costs did not procedurally conform with 
the requirements of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(4). Appellant’s Brief at 39. The District 
Court correctly rejected this argument and found that CLC’s memorandum of costs and supporting 
affidavits conform with Rule 54(d). Order Awarding Fees at 3 [R. 976] (citing Est. of Holland v. 
Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 94, 102-03, 279 P.3d 80, 88-89 (2012)); see also Resp. 
to Defendants’ Suppl. Memo. in Supp. of Mot. to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs [R. 906-09]; 
Suppl. Aff. of William B. Ingram at 2, ¶ 7 [R. 911]. 
                                               
33 “It is of no consequence that the underlying contractual obligation is unenforceable. A prevailing 
party may recover attorney fees even though no liability under a contract was established or where 
no contract was, in fact, ever formed.” Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 439, 80 P.3d 1031 
(2003) (quoting Hilbert v. Hough, 132 Idaho 203, 207, 969 P.2d 836, 840 (Ct. App. 1998)). Thus, 
JTS is incorrect in its reliance on O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc. that a severability clause must 
be included in the contract. Appellant’s Brief at 38. In that case, the Court found that the 
unenforceable instrument “was a contract and had a severability clause[.]” 145 Idaho 904, 912, 
188 P.3d 846, 854 (2006). The Court did not hold that the additional fact of a severability clause 
was necessary to enforcing the attorney provision. Id. JTS’s reliance on Ellis v. Butterfield is also 
misplaced. Appellant’s “Brief at 38-39. In Ellis, the Court held that respondents who terminated a 
contract could not “later assert the attorney fee clause in it while defending successfully against 
[the] appellants’ action to reinstate the contract.” 98 Idaho 644, 650, 570 P.2d 1334, 1340 (1977). 
Here, CLC never claimed to have terminated the Lease before the term expired, and JTS never 
asked to reinstate the contract. Rather, CLC argued, and the District Court found, that JTS was a 
holdover tenant that continued to be bound by provisions of the Lease, including the fee provision. 
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees. 
A. JTS does not challenge costs. 
JTS does not challenge the District Court's award of costs on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION (I.A.R. 35(b)(7)) 
The District Court made correct factual findings and correct legal conclusions about JTS 's 
unlawful detention and breach of the Lease. The District Court correctly awarded damages and 
attorney fees to CLC. For the foregoing reasons, CLC should prevail in this appeal. CLC 
respectfully requests the Court issue the appropriate remittitur and, pursuant to the above-cited 
statutes and provision of the Lease, award CLC attorney fees and costs for this appeal. 
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